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We investigate numerically how indexation of funded pensions for inflation can be 
differentiated across the various groups of fund participants. The pension arrangement is 
modelled after the Dutch situation. While the aggregate welfare consequences are small, 
group-specific consequences are more substantial with the workers and future born losing and 
retirees benefitting from a shift away from uniform indexation. Those welfare shifts result 
from systematic redistribution of welfare rather than shifts in the benefit of risk sharing 
provided by the system. 
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Funded social security systems are vulnerable to ￿nancial market shocks as the consequences of
the recent ￿nancial crisis have shown. These consequences have also alerted both policymakers
and academics to the question how risks should be shared among the participants in funded pen-
sion systems. It is well known from the literature that non-funded social security can raise welfare
through the intergenerational sharing of income risks (Enders and Lapan, 1982, and Merton, 1983).
However, there has been less research on how pension funds can a⁄ect welfare through intergen-
erational risk sharing. The literature suggests that income uncertainty is just weakly correlated
with the uncertainty on asset returns (Heaton and Lucas, 2000). This makes pension funds a priori
suitable vehicles for risk sharing between workers and retirees. This is also the case for the second
pension pillar in the Netherlands, which to a certain extent can be characterised as a de￿ned-bene￿t
(DB) system. In this paper we will explore how the indexation of pension rights to price and wage
in￿ ation can be adjusted to improve the operation of the system.
The overall Dutch pension system is largely based on an unfunded pay-as-you-go (PAYG) ￿rst
pillar and a funded second pillar.1 The Dutch pension system shares features with systems like
those in, for example, the US,2 Germany and Switzerland. The Dutch second pillar is unusually
large, though, because it is roughly the size of the ￿rst pillar and it is expected to grow further in
relative terms. Through their contributions to sectoral or company pension funds workers build up
pension rights to a future nominal pension. Both contribution and accumulation rates are identical
across a fund￿ s participants. Hence, those on higher incomes contribute more and accumulate more
rights. Second pillar bene￿ts are of a de￿ned-bene￿t nature in the sense that accumulated rights
guarantee the holder a nominally-￿xed bene￿t in euros as of retirement until death. Accumulated
rights are usually once a year heightened up to compensate for the past rate of price in￿ ation, so
as to protect the purchasing power of the pension, or wage in￿ ation, so as to have the pension
bene￿t track the general increase in welfare. However, indexation is not required by law and the
board of the pension fund may index by less than full or not even at all if this is deemed necessary
to maintain a healthy funding ratio as measured by the ratio of pension assets and liabilities.
The pension fund is a vehicle for intergenerational risk sharing. For example, ￿nancial market
developments a⁄ect the size of the pension bu⁄ers and may lead to a change in the contribution rate
and/or the indexation rate. This way, younger generations share in the ￿nancial market risks that
tend to be mostly concentrated among the older people. By linking indexation to wages, retirees
share in the productivity risk which is mostly born by the workers (Bohn, 2006). Uncertainties in
life expectancy can be bu⁄ered by both changes in indexation and pension premia.
When the funding ratio falls below a given "long-term" threshold (roughly 125% for a fund
with average investment risk), the fund has to submit a "long-term" (15 year) restoration plan to
the supervisor, the Dutch central bank (DNB), to return to above this threshold, while when the
funding ratio falls below 105%, a situation called "underfunding", it has to submit a "short-term" (3
or 5 year) plan to undo the underfunding. Funds have to rely on a mix of reduced indexation, higher
contributions and, in case these instruments provide insu¢ cient restoration power, partially writing
o⁄ existing pension rights. The latter instrument is considered the last resort and supervision is
aimed at avoiding this in all but very exceptional circumstances.
This paper focuses on changes in indexation as the main instrument for the stabilisation of
1The system also features a third pillar, which is based on voluntary (tax-facilitated) savings mostly through
insurance companies. This pillar is of relatively minor importance, though.
2Nowadays, most pension funds in the U.S. are of a de￿ned contribution (DC) type, but pension funds in the
public sector are generally of a DB type. Hence, the Dutch second pillar resembles more closely the situation in the
U.S. public sector.
2pension bu⁄ers, because contribution rates in the Netherlands are generally thought to have reached
their "natural" maximum. Indexation of pension rights is usually uniform over the entire group
of participants in the fund. However, there is a growing discussion whether the policy parameters
should be di⁄erentiated across the various groups of participants in a pension fund. Speci￿cally,
Hurst and Willen (2007) ￿nd it typically welfare improving to have pension contributions increase
with the worker￿ s age. Indeed in the Netherlands much of the discussion focuses on di⁄erentiating
contribution and accumulation rates over cohorts. Another, related instrument is the di⁄erentiation
of indexation across the various groups of participants in a fund. However, to the best of our
knowledge there exist no analysis of what would be the best way to di⁄erentiate indexation across
groups of fund participants. This is exactly what we will analyse in this paper.
Because accumulated pension rights are increasing over a person￿ s working life, retirees and
those close to retirement will be hurt most by a uniform reduction in indexation. Moreover, these
groups are left with little or no ￿ exibility to make up for any loss of indexation by working more,
while, in addition, a given loss of purchasing power has to be absorbed by a consumption reduction
over a relatively short remaining lifetime. Hence, these groups are at particular risk under policies
that resort to changing the indexation rate in order to keep pension bu⁄ers stable. Because ￿nancial
market risks are a major source of ￿ uctuation in pension bu⁄ers, pension income of the elderly
is particularly sensitive to ￿nancial market shocks even though the younger generations would be
best placed to bear this source of risk given the imperfect correlation between the return on human
wealth and that on ￿nancial wealth. In fact, the seminal analysis in Bodie et al. (1992) shows that
the share of total (human plus ￿nancial) wealth invested in equity should be constant over one￿ s
lifetime, implying that shocks in shock prices have identical proportional e⁄ects on consumption
at all ages. This would be an argument to shift a disproportionate part of the indexation risk to
younger workers, at least to the extent that this risk is primarily linked to the ￿nancial market
performance of the pension fund￿ s asset portfolio.
We explore the following alternatives to uniform indexation across the participants. One is to
have "status-dependent" indexation, in which the retired always receive exactly enough indexation
to compensate for price in￿ ation, while the indexation rate of the entire group of workers moves
uniformly in response to changes in the pension bu⁄er. We also consider more complicated al-
ternatives to uniform indexation. One is to reduce changes in the indexation rate with age, the
idea being that older people hold more rights on average and, hence, are hurt more severely by
uncertainty in the indexation rate. A ￿nal alternative is to make indexation dependent on income
such that higher-income individuals absorb relatitvely more of the uncertainty about indexation
than those on lower incomes.
We develop an applied small-open economy overlapping generations model with annual cohorts
of heterogeneous agents and a pension system that incorporates the main features of the Dutch
system. In our stochastic simulations, calibrated to the situation in the Netherlands, we hit the
economy with a variety of unexpected shocks. These may be broadly classi￿ed into three categories:
demographic uncertainty (the size of newborn generations and survival probabilities that determine
life expectancy), economic uncertainty (productivity growth and the in￿ ation rate) and ￿nancial
uncertainty (bond and equity returns and yield curve).
In spite of all the reasonable arguments that can be put forward in favour of di⁄erentiating
indexation, we ￿nd that at the aggregate level, as measured by the equivalent variation for all
groups together, uniform indexation tends to perform better than any of the alternatives. The
average di⁄erence in terms of compensating initial resources is relatively small, though, and is
always less than 0:5% of the initial resources of individuals. At the group level the e⁄ects are
larger. Initial retirees bene￿t from a switch away from uniform indexation, while the workers and
3future born are net payers for the switch. Most of the bene￿t to the initially retired and the
payment by the others is purely redistributional. Only a relatively small part of the welfare e⁄ects
is the result of a di⁄erence in the e⁄ectiveness of risk sharing. We also investigate the robustness of
these results by varying within reasonable bounds the initial pension bu⁄er and the assumed equity
premium. However, the results remain qualitatively unaltered. Under all indexation schemes, the
average indexation rate has to decline over time to maintain the fund￿ s sustainability in the wake of
increasing longevity. An increase in the retirement age that leaves existing pension rights untouched
does little to avoid this decline and leaves our basic results essentially unaltered.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of the literature on risk
sharing within social security systems. Section 3 lays out the main elements of the model. Section
4 describes the policy rule and the benchmark calibration. Section 5 reports the results of the sto-
chastic simulations for the various forms of indexation under the benchmark calibration. Section 6
presents a robustness analysis varying the initial funding ratio and the equity returns, while Section
7 concludes the main text. Finally, the online appendix provides further details on the basic model,
the estimated shock processes, the policy rule followed by the pension funds and the outcomes of
some variations on our benchmark. It is available at http://www1.fee.uva.nl/mint/beetsma.shtm.
2 Literature review
Bodie et al. (1992) use a life-cycle model with the possibility to invest in two assets (risk-free and
equity). They start with the case of a non-stochastic wage and consider the case of a constant level
of labour supply optimally chosen at the start of one￿ s life and the case of ￿ exible labor supply that
can respond to the performance of their investment portfolio. In particular, a bad performance
induces individuals to increase their labour supply. More importantly, the opportunity to ex post
vary the labor supply leads individuals to invest with more risk. The optimal amount invested
in equity is proportional to total wealth, i.e. the sum of human and ￿nancial wealth. Under
￿ exible labour supply, human wealth is measured as the discounted sum of wage earnings under
the assumption that leisure is zero throughout one￿ s life, while under ￿xed labor supply, it is
measured as the discounted sum of wage earnings obtained under the given amount of working
time. The main results are the following. The initial amount of investment in equity is likely to
substantially exceed ￿nancial wealth at the beginning of one￿ s life. Moreover, it is higher under
￿ exible labor supply. Further, the share of ￿nancial wealth invested in equity is decreasing over
one￿ s working life as human capital gets depleted and becomes constant upon retirement. Bodie
et al. (1992) also consider stochastic wages. The processes for the wage rate and the stock price
are assumed to be perfectly correlated. The consequence is that human capital can be seen as
equivalent to the combination of an investment in equity and an investment in a risk-free asset.
Hence, through their human capital individuals already possess an implicit investment in equity
and, hence, the explicit investment in the risky asset is the di⁄erence between the total desired
exposure to equity risk and the implicit exposure already present.
In the view of Teulings and De Vries (2006) the role of pension funds is to take intertemporal
consumption decisions on behalf of participants who ￿nd it di¢ cult to take such decisions for
themselves and to allow for intra-temporal sharing of longevity risks. They build a model in
which individuals supply until their exogenous retirement age a given amount of labour against
a deterministic wage. Further, they die at a given, known age and they can invest in risk-free
bonds and risky equity. The results on the optimal investment allocation are essentially identical
to those in Bodie et al. (1992). Gains from intergenerational risk-sharing can be obtained when
new pension fund participants absorb upon entry part of the fund￿ s gains or losses made in recent
4years before the entry. This way new entrants invest over a longer period of their life in equity,
thereby further diversifying their risk exposure. This type of risk sharing is e⁄ectively applied in
the Dutch pension system, as new entrants share in the under- or overfunding of their fund at the
moment of entry, thereby sharing in the past investment performance of the fund. The optimal
response to a shock to the value of the fund￿ s portfolio is an identical proportional reduction in
consumption over the entire future, while the pension contribution rate is raised over the remaining
working career. Finally, Teulings and De Vries (2006) also consider a de￿ned-bene￿t generational
accounting structure, in which wealth at the moment of retirement is ￿xed at a level su¢ cient to
￿nance the future bene￿ts with certainty. Hence, as of retirement date all wealth is invested in
risk-free bonds. This produces a welfare loss, because it would be optimal to hold at least some
equity.
Cui et al. (2010) compare intergenerational risk sharing in funded pension schemes with
individually-optimal investment schemes. The funded pensions feature DB elements. If assets
minus liabilities are positive (negative) then contributions may be reduced (raised) and pension
bene￿ts may be raised (reduced). Three types of risk-sharing rules are considered in the case of
a mismatch. Under the ￿rst rule only contributions are changed and only workers share in the
risks. Under the second rule, only bene￿ts are changed and only the retired share in the risk,
while under the ￿nal rule both contributions and bene￿ts are adjusted. This is the preferred
regime, because under this regime the largest number of generations share in the risks. Under this
scheme investment in risky assets is largest, while the adjustment parameters in contributions and
bene￿ts are small implying that mismatch vanishes only gradually. However, this is still not the
optimal regime. Under a social planner adjustment is even slower to spread shocks over even more
generations, which allows the fund to take on even more portfolio risk.
Our framework di⁄ers in a number of ways from that in the other contributions discussed here.
In Teulings and De Vries (2006) there is only uncertainty about the return on the investment
portfolio. Also in Bodie et al. (1992) there is only one source of uncertainty. Even when wages are
stochastic, they are perfectly correlated with equity returns. We allow for more sources of risk in our
model and, in particular, for demographic risk and in￿ ation risk. Speci￿cally, in contrast to Bodie et
al. (1992), productivity risks and stock market returns are imperfect correlated. This is important,
because under this assumption a pension fund acquires a useful role in reallocating productivity
risk from workers to retirees and reallocating stock market risk from retirees to workers. We deviate
from the other contributions by allowing for intragenerational inequality and rising life expectancy
and by explicitly addressing indexation policy, which plays a crucial role in DB funded pension
systems. The additional complications that we introduce in this paper also force us to make some
simplications in some directions. In particular, we will assume that the labour supply and the
composition of individual investment portfolios are exogenous.3 This latter assumption has the
advantage that we simulate a model with realistic portfolio allocations.4
3 The model
There are D overlapping cohorts each period, with a period corresponding to one year. Further,
all individuals within a given group earn the same income.
3Related works that allow for endogenous labour supply in funded pension systems are Bucciol and Beetsma
(2010) and Bonenkamp and Westerhout (2010).
4Investment allocations determined through optimisation lead to portfolios with unrealistically high shares of
equity. This is problematic for simulations aimed at realistically quantifying the consequences of alternative policy
scenarios.
53.1 Cohorts and demography
We assume that individuals enter the labour force at their 25th birthday and we denote by the age
of a cohort the amount of time since entry into the labor force. The age is indicated by the index
j = 1;:::;D. Each period there is an exogenous age-dependent probability that an individual will
die. An individual who has entered the labour force at the start of period t ￿ (j ￿ 1) = t ￿ j + 1
has an exogenous marginal probability  j;t￿j+1 2 [0;1] of reaching age j at the end of period t
conditional on having reached age j￿1 at the end of period t￿1. This probability is stochastic and
exhibits a downward trend, thereby causing an upward trend in the average age of the population.
Further, the cohort of newborns (i.e. new entrants into the labour force) in period t is 1+nt times
larger than the cohort of newborns one period earlier, where nt is also stochastic.
3.2 Skill groups and the income process
Each individual belongs to some skill group i, with i = 1;:::;I, and remains in this skill group during
its entire working life. A higher value of i corresponds to a higher skill level. The division into skill
groups is such that all groups contain an equal number of individuals. Given the macroeconomic
circumstances, an individual￿ s income is uniquely determined by the combination of its age and
skill level. In other words, all the individuals of a given age in the same skill-group earn the same
hourly wage. We allow for skill-related income di⁄erences, because individuals below a certain
income level cannot build up claims to a second-pillar pension in the Dutch system and, hence,
those individuals will be hardly a⁄ected by policy changes in the second pillar. A shift from
one scenario to another may have substantially di⁄erent welfare consequences for an individual
depending on its skill level. Hence, assuming away intra-generational heterogeneity would not
do justice to this important aspect of the Dutch second-pillar system and would prevent us from
making realistic individual welfare comparisons.
Individuals work for R years after which they retire and they live for at most D years after
entry into the labour force. During their working life, they receive a labour income yi;j;t given by:
yi;j;t = eisjzt; (1)
where ei; i = 1;:::;I is the e¢ ciency index for skill group i, sj; j = 1;:::;R is a seniority index to
allow income for a given skill level to vary with age, and zt is the exogenous process
zt = (1 + gt)zt￿1; (2)
where gt is its exogenous, stochastic nominal growth rate and z0 = 1.
3.3 Social security and accidental bequests
The social security system consists of two pillars that closely resemble the Dutch pension system.
The ￿rst pillar is a PAYG arrangement organized by the government, which sets the contribution
rate such that this pillar is balanced on a period-by-period basis. This pillar pays out a ￿ at bene￿t
to every retiree and is a given fraction of average income, implying that the contribution rate is
adjusted in response to shocks. Although this pillar plays a relatively minor role in our analysis, it
is a relevant element of our model, because it provides an important share of the income of large
groups of retirees. In particular, given the franchise for the second pillar (as explained below),
for low-skilled individuals the ￿rst pillar is the only or main source of income in retirement. As a
result, changes in the second pillar can only have limited welfare consequences for these individuals.
The second pillar consists of private pension funds that provide de￿ned bene￿t nominal pensions.
63.3.1 The ￿rst pillar of the social security system
Each period, an individual of working age pays a mandatory contribution pF
i;j;t to the ￿rst pillar




















































Nj;t is average income. In
period t the bene￿t received by an individual retiree is a fraction ￿F of average income:
bF
t = ￿Fyt: (4)
Each period the contribution rate ￿
F
t is adjusted such that aggregate contributions into the ￿rst
pillar equal aggregate ￿rst-pillar bene￿ts. Notice that someone on an income lower than ￿
lyt pays
no contribution, but still receives the same bene￿t as someone with a high income.
3.3.2 The second pillar of the social security system
Each period, a worker pays a mandatory contribution pS
i;j;t to the second pillar if its income exceeds





t maxf0;yi;j;t ￿ ￿ytg; j ￿ R; (5)
where ￿
S
t is a policy parameter, which we assume to be capped at a maximum value of ￿
S;max > 0.
The contract underlying a second-pillar pension arrangement in the Netherlands generally imposes
a cap on the contribution rate and we include this feature into the model.
An individual from skill group i of cohort j receives a second-pillar pension bene￿t linked to
his entire wage history given by:
bS
i;j;t = Mi;j;t; j > R; (6)
where Mi;j;t is the "stock of nominal pension rights" accumulated by the end of period t. It is the
annual bene￿t in euros that the retiree receives each year during retirement, as long as this number
is not revised through indexation or a reduction by writing o⁄ existing rights.5 Variable Mi;j;t is
a stock variable that increases with each additional year of work the individual has provided. At










; j ￿ R





where parameter ￿ is the annual accrual rate and parameter !i;j;t is the rate of indexation of
nominal rights. It will depend on the ￿nancial position of the pension fund, as we will detail below,
and it is also allowed to be potentially cohort- and skill-group speci￿c . Further, mt > 0 is a
5For example, someone of age 35 who has accumulated 2000 euros of nominal rights, would, if he were to stop
working now and in the absence of indexation or a reduction, receive 2000 euros each year as of his 65th birthday.
7proportional reduction in nominal rights that may be applied when the funding ratio is so low that
restoration is no longer possible using other instruments, while mt < 0 when earlier reductions are
undone. We assume that mt > 0 only when !i;j;t = 0. Each individual enters the labour market
with zero nominal claims (Mi;0;t￿j = 0 for any i and t). In contrast to the ￿rst-pillar pension
bene￿t, the second-pillar bene￿t depends on both the cohort and skill level of the individual.
Given the accrual rate ￿ and franchise share ￿, the choice of the fund￿ s policy parameters ￿
S
t ,





where At and Lt are the values of the fund￿ s assets, respectively liabilities. At the end of period t
the fund￿ s assets are aggregate contributions in period t minus total bene￿ts paid out in period t








































t is the average nominal return on the fund￿ s assets in period t ￿ 1, rlb
t is the return on
long-term bonds and re
t the return on equities. All asset returns are exogenously determined on
the international ￿nancial markets, in line with the situation of the Netherlands being a small open
economy operating under perfect capital mobility. Further, an exogenous share ze of the fund￿ s
value is invested in equities and the remainder in long-term nominal bonds. Actual data for Dutch
pension funds show a rather stable composition over the years, which may point to pension funds
aiming at stable targets for the various asset categories. For this reason we assume that ze is
constant.
The long-term bonds held by the pension fund always have a 10-year maturity. Therefore, at














9;t) is the yield on a 10-year (9-year) zero coupon bond in year t ￿ 1 (year t).
The fund￿ s liabilities are the sum of the present values of current and future rights already









where Li;j;t is the liability to the cohort of age j and skill level i, which is computed as the
discounted sum of the projected future nominal bene￿ts based on the current stock of nominal
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; if j > R
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
: (12)
When j ￿ R, we discount all future bene￿ts to the current year t, but of course they will only be paid
out once individuals have retired. Crucially, in the Netherlands the computation of the liabilities
excludes any future indexation. Hence, pension funds that aim at maintaining the purchasing
power of the accumulated rights need to maintain a funding ratio that is substantially above 100%.
3.3.3 Accidental bequests
The only role of accidental bequests in the model is to ensure that resources do not "disappear"
because people die. The government collects all the ￿nancial assets from those who die and redis-
tributes them through equal transfers to all those who are alive.
3.4 The individual decision problem
Each period individuals choose nominal consumption ci;j;t. The state variables are assets ai;j;t and
the income process zt. The individual￿ s value function is:
Vi;j;t (ai;j;t;zt) = max
ci;j;t
￿




ai;j+1;t+1 = (1 + rj;t+1)(ai;j;t ￿ ci;j;t + e yi;j;t);














where ￿t is the rate of price in￿ ation in period t. Further, e yi;j;t is total income net of contributions:
e yi;j;t =
(
yi;j;t + ht ￿ pF
i;j;t ￿ pS
i;j;t; if j ￿ R
bF
t + bS
i;j;t + ht; if j > R
)
;
where ht is the accidental bequest, while the portfolio rate of return depends on the age-speci￿c
share invested in equities, xj:











where a share (1 ￿ xj) is invested in one-year bonds against a return rsb
t+1.
93.5 The shocks
The estimation of the shock processes is described in detail in the online appendix. Here, we
provide only a brief description. There are only aggregate shocks in the model. The menu of
shocks consists of demographic shocks, shocks to the income growth rate and the in￿ ation rate,
which together detemine productivity shocks, and ￿nancial market shocks. All these shocks are
















t : shock to the newborn cohort growth rate, nt.
￿ ￿
 







t: shock to the nominal income growth rate, gt.
￿ ￿￿
t : shock to the in￿ ation rate, ￿t.
￿ ￿e
t: shock to the nominal equity return, re
t.
￿ ￿sb
t : shock to the one-year "short-term" bond return, rsb
t .
￿ ￿b
k;t;k = 2;:::;D: shock to the nominal bond return at maturity k, rb
k;t.
All these shocks a⁄ect the funding ratio, while only demographic shocks a⁄ect the ￿rst-pillar
of the pension system. In response to the shocks the parameters of the pension system may need
to be adjusted to restore the balance in the ￿rst pillar and to maintain sustainability of the second
pillar.
Each demographic shock is distributed independently of all the other shocks. The growth rate
nt of the newborn cohort depends on deterministic and random components:
nt = n + ￿n
t ;
where n is the mean and ￿n
t the innovation at time t, which follows an AR(1) process. The survival
probabilities evolve according to a Lee-Carter (1992) model. We allow the shocks to the in￿ ation
rate, the nominal income growth, the one-year bond return and the equity return to be correlated


















































































































































Hence, our shocks consist of a deterministic component, which is a linear combination of previous-
year shocks, and a purely random component, given by realizations from i.i.d. innovations.
The yield curve is constructed by setting the return rb
1;t at the one-year maturity at rsb
t and
the returns at higher maturities k ￿ 2 equal to the sum of the one-year return rsb
t plus the excess
of the return at maturity k relative to the one-year return, e rb
k;t, which is simulated on the basis of
an estimated vector autoregressive distributed lag (VADL) process with lag 1 for e rb
k;t; k = 2;:::;D.
103.6 Welfare comparisons between policy scenarios
We compare welfare between the two scenarios A (our benchmark scenario) and B (the alternative)
at the start of period t = 1 for individuals alive at that moment and at the start of their ￿rst year of
life for individuals that are born later. The individual welfare comparison is based on the equivalent
variation EVi;j;t, which for skill group i of cohort j we de￿ne as the amount of wealth that should
be added in scenario A to obtain the same utility as in scenario B. That is, for those alive at the
start of t = 1, we de￿ne EVi;j;1 by the equation
V A
i;j;1 (ai;j;1 + EVi;j;1;z1) = V B
i;j;1;
where (ai;j;1 + EVi;j;1;z1) are the arguments of the value function, that is the level of assets plus
the equivalent variation and the level of the income process at the start of t = 1, while for those
born at the start of t ￿ 2, we de￿ne EVi;1;t by the equation
V A
i;1;t (ai;1;t + EVi;1;t;zt) = V B
i;1;t;
where ai;1;t +EVi;1;t is the initial level of assets at birth plus the equivalent variation and zt is the
level of the income process at the start of t. The equivalent variations for various groups can be



























This expression sums the equivalent variations of all individuals alive at time t = 1 and the equiva-
lent variations at birth (j = 1) of all future-born individuals discounted at the rate (1 + g)(1 + n)￿




EVi;1;k grows on average at the same rate
g as nominal income and each new generation N1;k in period k is on average (1 + n) times the
size of the previous young generation. Hence, the weight of future-born generations in the overall
measure EV is made comparable to the weight of the currently-alive generations.













where 1f:g is an indicator function that equals unity if the condition within the curly parentheses
holds, and 0 otherwise.
4 The policy rule
The government automatically adjusts the contribution rate ￿
F
t 2 (0;1) to maintain a balanced
￿rst pillar of the pension system. On average, this contribution rate increases over the years along
with the ageing of the population. More policy options are available to a⁄ect the funding ratio of
the second pillar. There are three key parameters, of which the period t+1 values are determined








parameter ￿t+1 ￿ 0 and, as a last resort, a reduction (mt+1 > 0) or restoration (mt+1 < 0) of the
nominal pension rights. Parameter ￿t+1 ￿ 0 captures the average (across the population) degree
of indexation to nominal wage growth. The board of the pension fund selects the contribution rate
and the indexation parameter, but can only reduce nominal rights under special circumstances, as
described below.
11We de￿ne three threshold values for the funding ratio, ￿
l = 1:05 < ￿
m < ￿
u = 1:50, where
￿
m = 1:25.6 When the funding ratio Ft exceeds ￿
m, after restoring possible earlier cuts in nominal
rights, the fund￿ s Board sets the contribution rate ￿
S
t+1 at its initial level ￿
S
1 and the indexation





￿u￿￿m. Hence, indexation in t + 1 increases linearly in Ft and is
complete (equal to 1) at ￿
u. Notice that, due to population ageing, the contribution rate ￿
S
1 will be
increasingly insu¢ cient to ￿nance aggregate bene￿ts. The result is that indexation will on average
be falling over time. Moreover, notice that indexation exceeds unity when the funding ratio exceeds
￿
u. This way the funding ratio is stabilised from above.
As mandated by the Dutch Pension Law, when the funding ratio falls below ￿
m, but remains
above ￿
l, a long-term restoration plan is started, while when it falls below ￿
l, a short-term restora-
tion plan is started. The latter situation is termed "underfunding". The long-term restoration plan
requires a restoration of the funding ratio to at least ￿
m in at most Kl = 15 years (ignoring possible
future shocks), while the short-term restoration plan requires restoration to at least ￿
l in at most
Ks = 5 years (ignoring possible future shocks). Hence, policy aims at keeping the funding ratio
above ￿
m. This is achieved by following an "indexation policy", of which the primary instrument
















The projected funding ratio is then computed (assuming further shocks are absent) and compared
with its target prescribed by the restoration plan. If necessary, the contribution rate ￿
S
t is raised
up to at most the maximum ￿
S;max. Conform Dutch Law, when there is underfunding (Ft < ￿
l)
and the adjustments in the indexation parameter and the contribution rate are jointly insu¢ cient,
nominal rights are scaled back by whatever amount is necessary to eliminate the underfunding
within the allowed restoration period. In the case of a long-term restoration plan, nominal rights
remain untouched.
The indexation parameter ￿t is identical for the entire population, but the actual level of
indexation received by each individual may di⁄er with the policy adopted. The growth rate !i;j;t
of pension rights of an individual with skill level i and age j in period t is given by:
!i;j;t = g￿ + [maxf0;gt￿tg ￿ g￿]f (i;j); (17)
where [maxf0;gt￿tg ￿ g￿] measures the deviation of actual indexation from its target g￿. We
set the target indexation rate at ￿ = 2
3, implying that the target is to have indexation cover
price in￿ ation on average.7 If nominal income growth is relatively high, such that gt￿t > g￿ and
f (i;j) > 0, then indexation exceeds target indexation. The function f (i;j) allows the pension
fund to allocate more of less of the deviation of actual indexation gt￿t from target indexation g￿ to
speci￿c skill and age groups. The idea is that some groups might have less capacity to bear the risk
associated with indexation, while other groups may have more capacity in this regard. Obviously,
if the fund is supposed to reduce indexation uncertainty for some groups, then for other groups
uncertainty will be raised. Hence, we may have f (i;j) < 1 for some groups and f (i;j) > 1 for
other groups.
6The lower threshold is the o¢ cial one imposed by the supervisors in the Netherlands in order to protect the
nominal pension rights. The upper threshold corresponds to the one at which many funds start providing full
indexation to nominal wages, hence the one at which the value of the pension rights grows in line with the overall
welfare level.
7In our calibration average price growth is 2=3 of average nominal wage growth. Of course, shocks may alter this
ratio.
12We consider a baseline of "uniform" indexation, in which indexation is the same for all the
fund participants, and three schemes in which indexation is made contingent. Under "status-
contingent" indexation, retirees always receive a certain indexation rate (corresponding to full price
indexation on average), while all workers receive an identical, but uncertain indexation rate. Under
"age-contingent" indexation, the uncertainty about indexation falls with age. Under "income-
contingent" indexation, the uncertainty about indexation is smaller when the present value of
second-pillar pension income is larger relative to the present value of income from all sources.
(1) Baseline: uniform indexation
In any given year, indexation is identical for all the individuals. That is,
f (i;j) = 1:
We take this as the benchmark case. It is also the most common situation in the Netherlands.
(2) Status-contingent indexation
For retirees the indexation rate is constant over time, whatever is the size of the funding




￿s j ￿ R
0 j > R
;
where ￿s > 0. This is the simplest possible variation on the benchmark of uniform indexation.
The rationale for this scheme is that retirees have relatively little room for responding to shocks,
because their expected remaining life expectancy is relatively low. Fixing the indexation rate may
reduce their consumption uncertainty.
(3) Age-contingent indexation
All individuals are subject to uncertainty about actual indexation relative to target indexation.
However, the uncertainty shrinks with age. The rationale for this scheme is analogous to that for
the previous scheme: the older a person gets, the shorter its expected time to death and the larger
will be the e⁄ect of a given shock on its yearly consumption ￿ ow. Speci￿cally, we impose that
f (i;j) = ￿a (D ￿ j);
where ￿a > 0.
(4) Income-contingent indexation
Indexation is subject to uncertainty for all individuals, but uncertainty is negatively related to
the present value of second-pillar pension income relative to the present value of income from all
sources (labour, accidental bequests and ￿rst- and second-pillar pension bene￿ts) at time t = 1.8
In particular, for an age j and skill group i individual, the present value of second-pillar pension






















8We take the values at the beginning of the simulation to avoid the circularity problem of having indexation
rates that depend on the rescaling function, which in turn depends on indexation rates. The initial indexation rate
is known and is based on the initial funding ratio according to (16).
13Notice that this present value takes into account the uncertainty around death age (through the
survival probabilities), and discounts future bene￿ts using bond yield returns, as is common practice
in this literature (see, e.g., Bodie et al., 1992, or Pelizzon and Weber, 2009). To avoid complicating
matters too much we discount expected future bene￿ts against the average yield curve rb
l;l =






















and "labour income wealth" as the present value of future labour income realisations (plus acci-






















; j ￿ R
0; j > R
:
We de￿ne "human wealth" as the sum of labour income wealth, ￿rst-pillar pension wealth and
second-pillar pension wealth. Finally, we de￿ne PWS







i;j;1 + PV F
i;j;1 + PV S
i;j;1
:
The rescaling function for indexation is:












where ￿i > 0. The idea is that those with a relatively larger share of their human wealth in
the second pension pillar face less uncertainty about the deviation of actual indexation of their
second-pillar bene￿ts from its target level.
In the above schedules, the rescaling function f (i;j) depends only on one parameter that we
calibrate so as to produce a funding ratio similar to that under uniform indexation. In particular,
the parameter is always calibrated in such a way that applying the rescaling function does not















Figure 1 shows the pro￿le of the indexation schedules. In general, contingent-indexation policies
reduce the di⁄erence between actual and target indexation rates for older households. For income-
contingent indexation, the deviations are also smaller for richer households.















































a. All schemes b. Income-contingent
Figure 1. Rescaling functions
5 Calibration and simulation details
5.1 Benchmark calibration
The economically active life of an individual starts at his 25th birthday. He then works for R = 40
years. Individuals live for at most D = 75 years after entry into the labour force. We set the
discount factor at ￿ = 0:96, a rather common number in the macroeconomic literature (e.g., see
Imrohoroglu, 1989, or Krebs, 2007), and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion at ￿ = 3, which
accords quite well with the assumed risk aversion in much of the macroeconomic literature (see,
e.g., Imrohoroglu et al., 2003) as well as estimates at the individual level (for example, Gertner,
1993, and Beetsma and Schotman, 2001). The e¢ ciency index feig
I
i=1 is based on the income
deciles for the Netherlands for the year 2000 reported by the World Income Inequality Database
(WIID, version 2.0c, May 2008). We normalise the index such that it has an average value of unity.
The seniority index fsjg
I
j=1 uses the average of Hansen￿ s (1993) estimation of median wage rates
by age group. We take the average between males and females and interpolate the data using the
spline method. The composition of individual investment portfolios is exogenous given and the
shares xj;j = 1;:::;D invested in equity are based on the ￿gures reported by age in Table 9 of
Alessie et al. (2001).
The social security parameters are based on those for the Dutch pension system. The maximum
income assessable for contributions to the ￿rst pillar is 3;850:40 euros per month in 2008, as
reported by the Dutch Tax O¢ ce ("Belastingdienst"). Therefore, we set ￿
u = 1:10, which is
roughly equal to 3;850:40 ￿ 12=42;403, where 42;403 euros is our imputation for the economy￿ s
average income for 2008.9 Further, we set ￿
l = 0:4685, so as to generate an initial contribution
rate of ￿
F





calculate on the assumption that aggregate contributions and bene￿ts at time 1 are equal in the
absence of shocks. This value of ￿
S




S;max = 25%. Finally, we set the bene￿t scale factor at ￿F = 0:2435.
We assume that the pension fund always invests half of its portfolio in equities, hence we set
ze = 0:50 for any level of the funding ratio Ft. This corresponds roughly to the balance sheet
9Eurostat￿ s most recent ￿gure on average Dutch income refers to the year 2005. The same source also provides
minimum income until the year 2008. Exploiting the correlation between average and minimum income, we run an
OLS regression of average income on minimum income. As a result, we predict the average income for year 2008 to
be 42;403 euros.
15average for Dutch pension funds over the past 10 years (DNB, 2009). Because realised returns on
bond and equity investments will generally di⁄er, at the end of each period the fund reshu› es its
portfolio such that at the start of the next period the equity share is again ze = 0:50. We set the
pension accrual rate ￿ to 2% and the franchise parameter ￿ to 0:381.10
We calibrate ￿F and ￿ so as to generate realistic replacement rates at retirement date that are
on average equal to 30:40% for the ￿rst pillar and 37:60% for the second pillar. The ￿rst-pillar
replacement rate is decreasing in the skill level and ranges from an average of 12:06% for the highest
skill group to 63:33% for the lowest skill group. By contrast, the second-pillar replacement rate is
higher for more skilled groups and ranges from an average of 3:78% to an average of 56:64%. The
overall replacement rate of the two pillars together is higher for more skilled groups, but di⁄erences
are small and the average replacement rates range from 67:11% to 68:70%.
We choose initial assets so as to generate an initial funding ratio of 1:15.11 Consistent with
(16), we set ￿1 = 1
3.
The deterministic component of the growth rate of the newborn cohort, n = 0:2063%, is the
average annual growth rate based on the estimation of an order-one moving-average model of the
annual number of births in the Netherlands over the period 1906 ￿ 2005 (source is the Human
Mortality Database, 2009). Our calibration of the survival probabilities is based on the estimation
of a Lee and Carter (1992) model using Dutch period survival probabilities.12 The combination of
survival probabilities and birth rates determines the size of each cohort. The starting value of the
old-age dependency ratio (i.e., the ratio of retirees over workers) is 20:99%, in line with the OECD
(2009) ￿gure for the Netherlands in 2005.
The averages we calibrate for price in￿ ation, nominal income growth and the bond and equity
returns are reported in the ￿nal four lines of Table 1. We loosely follow the literature (see, e.g.,
Brennan and Xia, 2002, and van Ewijk et al., 2006) and set average annual in￿ ation at ￿ = 2%,
average annual nominal income growth at g = 3% (which corresponds to average real productivity
growth of 1% per annum) and the average one-year bond yield at rsb = 3%. Finally, we set the
average annual equity return at re = 6% in order to generate a funding ratio that is stable over
time in the absence of shocks and policy parameter changes.
10The maximum accrual rate that is ￿scally facilitated in the Netherlands is 2.25% for pension arrangements based
on the average wage over the working life and 2% for arrangements linked to the ￿nal wage.
11Initial assets A0 are 1:13 times aggregate income in the economy. This is quite comparable with second-pillar
pension assets in the Netherlands which are on the order of 120 ￿ 130% of GDP.
12With these probabilities, the average population age is initially set to 48.21 years and the remaining life ex-
pectancy to 33.54 years, as opposed to 33.23 years for a 48-year old in 2005 according to the actual data (see Human
Mortality Database, 2009).
16Table 1. Benchmark calibration of the exogenous parameters
Symbol Description Calibration
General setting
D Number of cohorts 75
R Number of working cohorts 40
￿ Discount factor 0:96
￿ Relative risk aversion parameter 3
feig
I
i=1 E¢ ciency index WIID (2008)
fsjg
I
j=1 Seniority index Hansen (1993)





Income thresholds in the contribution formula f0:469;1:10g
￿F Bene￿t scale factor 0:2435
Second pillar pension parameters
ze Equity share in fund portfolio 0:5
￿
KS;KL￿
Restoration periods in years f5;15g
￿ Second-pillar pension accrual rate 0:02
￿ Franchise share 0:381
F1 Initial funding ratio 1:15
￿
S;max Upper bound on contribution rate 0:25
Annual averages of the random variables
￿ In￿ ation rate 2%
g Nominal income growth rate 3%
rsb One-year nominal bond return 3%
re Equity return 6%
5.2 Simulation details
We draw Q = 1;000 sequences of vectors of unexpected shocks over 2D ￿ 1 + 250 = 399 years,
simulated from the joint distribution of all the shocks. Our welfare calculation is based on the
economy as of the Dth year in the simulation. Hence, we track only the welfare of the cohorts that
are alive in that year, implying that those that die earlier are ignored, and we track the welfare
of cohorts born later, the latest one dying in the ￿nal period of the simulation. In other words,
the total number of years of one simulation run equals the time distance between the birth of the
oldest cohort that we track and the complete extinction of the last unborn cohort that we track.
In each period there are D overlapping generations. For convenience, in the simulation we relabel
the Dth year as t = 1. The ￿rst D￿1 years of our simulation are needed to generate a distribution
of the assets across the various groups at the start of t = 1.
In each simulation run, we set the trends in newborn growth rates and in survival probabilities
to zero after t = 40, thereby stopping the ageing process after t = 40, although the shocks to both
processes remain. Hence, also mortality rates at any given age are no longer on a falling trend. For
several reasons we stop the ageing process after 40 years . First, we ￿nd it hard to imagine that
mortality rates continue falling inde￿nitely. Important common mortal diseases have already been
eradicated, while it will become increasingly di¢ cult to treat remaining lethal diseases, in particular
also because the share of healthcare in total spending will hit its limit at some moment. Second,
some important ageing studies, such as those by the Economic Policy Committee and European
Commission (2006) and the United Nations (2009), only project ageing (and its associated costs)
17up to 2050 (hence 40 years from now). Finally, we want to avoid an ever-growing population as a
result of the ageing process.
To allow for a proper comparison of the various indexation schedules, we use the same simulated
shock series for each schedule both during the initialisation phase and during the remainder of the
simulation run. At the start of the initialisation phase the pension rights of all the individuals are
set to zero and during this phase they accumulate pension rights according to (7), while indexation
is uniform and applied according to the schedule (16) and (17). Hence, the situation at the start
of t = 1 is identical for each run under the various indexation schedules. At the start of t = 1,
the process zt is rescaled to unity (z1 = 1) and both the nominal pension rights and the assets
accumulated through voluntary savings of all the individuals are rescaled by the same factor. Using
(11) and (12), we can then compute total pension liabilities at the start of t = 1. Because welfare
depends on the size of the bu⁄er after the initialisation period in the simulation run, we reset the
stock of pension fund assets such that the funding ratio at the start of t = 1 equals the desired
initial funding ratio, that is 1:15 in the benchmark case. In other words, the assets and liabilities
of the pension fund at the start of t = 1 are identical across the various indexation schedules. The
starting assets of the newborns are zero at the start of t = 1, ai;1;1 = 0.
To obtain the optimal consumption rules we solve the individual decision problem recursively
by backward induction using the method of "endogenous gridpoints" (Carroll, 2006). To avoid the
curse of dimensionality caused by having state variables for our shocks, we determine the optimal
consumption pro￿le in year t under the assumption that the shocks in year t￿1 are equal to their
average, and in t there are innovations following the VAR(1) process of the shocks in (13). While
this is an approximation, what matters mostly for agents￿decisions are future assets, which in turn
are largely determined by current assets and the wage rate. Existing deviations of shocks from
their averages play only a relatively minor role, in particular in the case of ￿nancial market shocks
for which persistence is small. We approximate the random variable distributions by means of a
Gauss-Legendre quadrature method (see Tauchen and Hussey, 1991) and discretise the state space
using a grid of 100 points with triple exponential growth.13 For points that lie outside the state
space grid, we use linear extrapolation to derive the optimal rule.
6 Results
6.1 Benchmark analysis
Panel a. of Figure 2 shows the median funding ratio for the various indexation schemes under
consideration.14 In all instances, the median funding ratio is kept well within the [￿
m;￿
u] interval
and, after the initial couple of years, when the funding ratio restores quickly from a situation of
underfunding, there is no clear trend visible. The dispersion in the median funding ratios across
the various indexation schemes is rather small. This is also the case for the coe¢ cient of variation
of the funding ratio, which is de￿ned as half the interquartile range over its median. It shows an
upward trend (see panel b. of Figure 2).
13We create an equally-spaced grid of the function log(1 + log(1 + log(1 + s))), where s is the state variable. The
grid with "triple exponential growth" applies the transformation exp(exp(exp(x) ￿ 1) ￿ 1) ￿ 1 to each point x of
the equally-spaced grid. This transformation brings the grid back to the original scale of the state variable, but
determines a higher concentration on the low end of possible values. A grid with triple exponential growth is more
e¢ cient than an equally-spaced grid as the consumption function is more sensitive to changes at small values of the
state variable.
14We report the median rather than the average funding ratio, because the former is not a⁄ected by the few
extreme outcomes in our simulations.
















































a. Median trend b. Coe¢ cient of variation
Figure 2. Funding ratio, benchmark case
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the various indexation policies. The statistics associated
with the funding ratio and the policy instruments are rather similar across the various cases. The
correlations between the value of the assets and liabilities are always rather high, between 60 and
70%, which is a necessity for pension funds that try to limit mismatches between the values of
the assets and liabilities. Further, irrespective of the speci￿c indexation scheme, in around 17%
of the time the funding ratio lies below ￿
l = 105%. This is substantially more frequent than the
2.5% of time that was foreseen by DNB, but it may quite well be in line with the frequency of
underfunding that we have observed over the past decade in the Netherlands. The likelihood that
the funding ratio is below ￿
m = 125% and a long-term restoration plan is needed is always in the
range 30 ￿ 35%. This likelihood equals the likelihood that one or more of the policy instruments
needs to be altered. The likelihood that the indexation rate needs to be adjusted and that this
su¢ ces is always around 4%. The likelihood that both the indexation rate and the contribution
rate have to be altered and the use of these instruments is su¢ cient is in the range of 32 ￿ 34%.
Finally, the likelihood that these instruments are jointly insu¢ cient and pension rights need to be
cut is around 0:6%.
19Table 2. Funding ratio properties, benchmark case
% Status Age Income
Uniform contingent contingent contingent
Funding ratio volatility (CV=coe¢ cient of variation)
Median CV 26.534 29.471 28.124 27.415
Median CV, assets 35.254 35.579 35.866 35.337
Median CV, liabilities 47.904 49.534 49.984 48.650
Assets-liabilities correlation 67.051 66.925 63.540 68.963
Probability of a funding ratio below a given threshold
Below ￿
l 16.991 16.917 17.131 17.021
Below ￿
m 38.652 37.597 37.669 38.200
Below ￿
u 62.961 61.343 61.547 62.117
Probability of a change in the indexation and contribution rates (with a ratio below ￿
m)
Only indexation rate 3.839 4.263 4.371 4.192
Both rates is enough 34.176 32.723 32.683 33.365
Both rates is not enough 0.637 0.612 0.616 0.643
Average policy parameters (standard deviation in parentheses)
Contribution rate ￿
S
t 19.554 19.493 19.360 19.459
(5.917) (5.923) (5.940) (5.930)
Indexation rate ￿t 28.870 29.601 30.298 29.604
(31.344) (31.400) (31.502) (31.424)
% Welfare comparison relative to uniform indexation
PER - 34.301 5.278 40.180
EV - -0.471 -0.160 -0.489
We observe that the indexation rate on average is around 29￿30%, well below what is needed
to preserve the purchasing power of the pension rights. Given the cap on the second-pillar funding
rate and the ￿xed retirement age despite the ageing process, the only way to maintain the long-run
sustainability of the second pension pillar is to gradually reduce the indexation rate. Figure 3
shows the average (remaining for those alive at t = 1) life-cycle indexation for each cohort in our
simulations. On average indexation is around 0:75 ￿ 1%, implying that with average in￿ ation of
2%, purchasing power of existing rights shrinks by around 1 ￿ 1:25% on average every year. The
average contribution rate (see Figure 4) is always 19% ￿ 20% of income above franchise, which is
about ￿fty percent above the starting value of the second pillar contribution rate.



















































a. Median b. Coe¢ cient of variation
Figure 3. Average lifetime indexation (% accumulated rights), benchmark























































a. Indexation rate b. Contribution rate
Figure 4. Average policy parameters, benchmark case
It is of interest to compare the projected increase in the contribution rate with that computed
in the Appendix to the Goudswaard-Report (Goudswaard et al., 2010). The Report takes 2009
as the initial year of its simulation and assumes that the initial funding ratio is 105%. Total
indexation is a weighted average of nominal wage growth and price in￿ ation with weights 0:65 and
0:35, respectively. Full indexation is given at a funding ratio of 135% or higher and zero indexation
at a funding ratio below 100%. If the funding ratio Ft is between 100% and 135%, indexation is
proportional with factor (Ft ￿ 100)=(135 ￿ 100). Based on an average nominal portfolio return of
5%, the contribution rate as a share of total salary rises from 12:7% in 2009 to 17:2% in 2050 (with
a peak of 19:4% in 2025). The increase in the contribution rate is proportionally somewhat less
than in our model, in which contribution rates are expressed in terms of income above franchise,
while the initial funding ratio in the Goudswaard-Report report is lower than in our benchmark
case. The di⁄erence is mostly explained by the fact that the return on the pension portfolio is
slightly lower in our case (4:5% instead of 5%).
Table 2 also reports a welfare comparison of alternative indexation schemes with the benchmark
of uniform indexation. In all instances, uniform indexation is preferred by a majority of those alive
in period 1 (as indicated by PER < 50). Also, when measured by the aggregate equivalent
variation EV , uniform indexation outperforms all the alternatives, although the outperformance
is on average relatively small. The value of ￿0:471% for EV under status-contingent indexation
21should be interpreted as follows. Status-contingent indexation produces the same welfare as uniform
indexation if under status-contingent indexation each generation alive at t = 1 gets 0:00471 extra
in resources (or 0:471% of their expected initial income), since the income process is normalised
to unity at t = 1, newborns at t = 2 get 0:00471 ￿ (1 + g) extra, the newborns at t = 3 get
0:00471 ￿ (1 + g)
2 extra, etcetera.
Figure 5 reports the welfare consequences for di⁄erent cohort-skill combinations of replacing
uniform indexation with one of its alternatives. Points above the horizontal axis indicate a wel-
fare gain compared with uniform indexation, and vice versa for points below the horizontal axis.
Considering the overall e⁄ect of a switch away from uniform indexation, we see that those who are
retired at t = 1 bene￿t on average substantially (between 2 and 3% of period t = 1 income) from
the alternative. For example, with status-contingent indexation, these generations bene￿t from the
higher indexation, aimed at protecting purchasing power, than the indexation they would receive
under uniform indexation. The same is the case with age-contingent and income-contingent index-
ation where the elderly and those for whom second-pillar pension income is relatively important are
most protected against a (downward) deviation from target indexation. It is the workers at t = 1
and the future born that pay for the bene￿t enjoyed by the retired. Importantly, by calculating
EV no shocks
i;j;1 and EV no shocks
i;1;t when shocks are absent and subtracting those values from the "over-
all" e⁄ects EVi;j;1 and EVi;1;t, we obtain the equivalent variations that are purely attributable to
the presence of shocks. Hence, these are the gains (or losses, if negative) from better (worse) risk
sharing under the alternative to uniform indexation. The risk-sharing e⁄ects are relatively small
compared to the overall e⁄ects, implying that the overall e⁄ects are dominated by systematic re-
distributions among groups of participants. In particular, under any of the alternatives to uniform
indexation there is a systematic redistribution from workers and future borns towards those that
are retired at t = 1.






































a. Status-contingent, overall e⁄ect b. Status-contingent, risk sharing e⁄ect






































c. Age-contingent, overall e⁄ect d. Age-contingent, risk sharing e⁄ect






































e. Income-contingent, overall e⁄ect f. Income-contingent, risk sharing e⁄ect
Figure 5. Welfare comparison (EV), benchmark case
Under any of the arrangements we have considered above, the burden of stabilising the pension
bu⁄er is mostly on adjusting the indexation rate. Hence, as we demontrated earlier in Figure
3, the e⁄ect of population ageing on the pension bu⁄er is countered by a gradual reduction in
the indexation rate. Figure 6 tracks the average real value of the second-pillar pension bene￿t
of someone in skill group 6 who retires at start of period t = 1 and someone of the same skill
group who retires at the beginning of period t = 25. Because individuals in skill group 1 are
usually below the franchise level, for most cohorts skill group 6 is the median skill level of those
23who build build up a pension through the fund. The horizontal axis depicts the number of years
into retirement and the vertical axis depicts the replacement rate of the bene￿t as a share of
the ￿nal wage. Hence, for someone who retires at the start of period 1 and who has been in
retirement for ￿ years, the real value of the pension bene￿t expressed in euros of the retirement date
is bS
i;j;￿=[(1 + ￿2) ￿ ::: ￿ (1 + ￿￿)]. Obviously, under status contingent indexation, the purchasing
power of a given retiree￿ s bene￿t is expected to remain constant until this person dies. However,
due to lagging indexation during working life someone who enters retirement at a later date will
receive a lower bene￿t in terms of the ￿nal wage. Hence, the replacement rate falls from 38% for
someone who retires at the start of the simulation to slightly more than 34% for someone who
enters retirement 24 years later. Under the three other arrangements, uniform, age-contingent and
income-contingent indexation, indexation falls short of price in￿ ation and the real value of the
bene￿t decreases during retirement. The largest decrease is under uniform indexation, where after
35 years almost 40% of the bene￿t￿ s real value has been lost. Not surprisingly, for someone who
enters retirement at t = 25, the real bene￿t is higher during ￿rst 15-20 years under the alternatives
to status-contingent indexation. During working life the accumulation of rights is faster, because
there is no need to ￿nance the high indexation given to the retired that would take place under
status-contingent indexation.













































































































































a. Individuals retiring at t = 1 b. Individuals retiring at t = 25
Figure 6. Real second-pillar bene￿ts (share of latest wage), benchmark
6.2 Robustness: varying the initial funding ratio and the equity return
We perform a robustness check on two important calibration parameters. First, we explore the case
of a lower initial funding ratio of 105% and a higher initial funding ratio of 125%. This is a relevant
variation, because we have seen recently that, as a result of the turbulence in the ￿nancial markets,
funding ratios can vary substantially over relative short periods of time. Hence, the starting
conditions can change rather dramatically within short periods of time. Nevertheless, the numerical
outcomes are very similar to those under the benchmark case. Hence, we report them only in the
online appendix. When the funding ratio is initially set to 105%, the likelihood of underfunding and
the average contribution rate become slightly higher, while the average indexation rate becomes
slightly lower, all this being the result of the deterioration in the starting position. The opposite
movements away from the benchmark occur when the initial funding ratio is set at 125%.
Second, we vary the average equity return and consider the case of an average equity return of
4% and an average equity return of 8%. Also this is a relevant variation to consider, because the
24uncertainty about future equity returns is particularly nowadays and funded pension systems are
generally considered to be vulnerable to ￿nancial market circumstances. Moreover, the Don et al.
(2009) "Parameters Commission" failed to agree on the expected equity return Dutch pension funds
need to use when calculating the contribution rate. Our simulations show that when the average
equity return is set to 4%, the funding ratio is less volatile, the average contribution rate is slightly
higher and the average indexation rate is slightly lower than under the benchmark calibration.
When the average equity return is set to 8%, the opposite is the case: the funding ratio is more
volatile, the average contribution rate is slightly lower and the average indexation rate tends to be
slightly higher than under the benchmark calibration.
As far as the welfare consequences of our variations are concerned, in all instances the aggregate
welfare e⁄ects as measured by EV are small. Only with relatively high average equity returns
aggregate welfare is slightly in favor of the alternatives to uniform indexation. However, the
welfare e⁄ects for individual groups can be quite large due to redistribution of welfare among
groups. As under the benchmark calibration, it is always the retirees who bene￿t from a shift away
from uniform indexation, while workers pay for such a shift.
6.3 Sensitivity analysis: raising the retirement age
An increase in the retirement age is usually put forward as one of the main options to increase the
￿nancial sustainability of the Dutch second-pillar pension system. In our model, life expectancy at
birth rises from 78:7 years for those born at time t = 1 to 83:0 years for those born at time t = 41,
after which it remains stable because we assume no further growth in the survival probabilities.
Our simulations up to now have been done under the assumption that the retirement age remains
constant. We will now explore how our earlier results are a⁄ected if we let the retirement age
gradually increase, such that the approximate 1 : 2 ratio of average retirement life relative to
average work life is preserved. Concretely, this implies that we raise the retirement age at three
moments, namely from 65 years to 66 years at t = 11, from 66 years to 67 years at t = 26 and,
￿nally, from 67 years to 68 years at time t = 41. After t = 41, the retirement age is kept ￿xed
at 68 years. To aim at the same replacement rate after a full working life under the new life
expectancy, whenever we raise the retirement age from Rold to Rnew = Rold + 1, we also reduce
the accrual rate ￿, from ￿old to ￿new = ￿old ￿
Rold=Rnew￿
. We assume that existing rights remain
untouched. Hence, older workers accumulate pension at a slower pace for only a relatively short
period. For example, someone who is 60 years at t = 11, will accumulate pension rights for next
6 years at a rate of ￿new. Obviously, given that ￿new = ￿old (40=41), this person will retire with
a higher replacement rate than under the old retirement age. Not surprisingly, the numerical
outcomes reported in Table 3 are very similar to those under the benchmark. This is the case
for the behaviour of the pension bu⁄er and the frequency with which long-term and short-term
restoration plans need to be implemented. Also the average values of the policy parameters are very
similar. In most instances, the average indexation rate is higher than under the benchmark, but
only slightly so. Aggregate welfare e⁄ects of a switch away from uniform indexation remain small,
while retirees continue to bene￿t from such a switch at the cost of the workers. The magnitudes
of the intergenerational welfare shifts remain of the same orders of magnitude as before (see the
online appendix). Overall, these results show that reducing the accumulation rate of pension rights
in response to increasing life expectancy without touching upon existing rights will have only little
e⁄ect on the sustainability of the second pillar and, thus, on the scope for providing su¢ cient
indexation to protect the real value of the retirement bene￿ts.
This ￿nding sheds light on the current discussion about the adjustment of the second pillar
25in the Netherlands. While all the groups involved in the restructuring agree that with its current
generosity the system is unsustainable in the sense of providing future generations with a decent
pension, there is substantial disagreement as to what extent old pension rights should be pro-
tected. Our results demonstrate that the currently retired would need to substantially contribute
to maintain the sustainability of the system.
Table 3. Funding ratio properties, varying retirement age
% Status Age Income
Uniform contingent contingent contingent
Funding ratio volatility (CV=coe¢ cient of variation)
Median CV 24.942 27.201 27.715 27.596
Median CV, assets 35.220 35.431 35.652 35.794
Median CV, liabilities 47.221 48.631 49.420 48.278
Assets-liabilities correlation 65.676 67.307 65.056 68.558
Probability of a funding ratio below a given threshold
Below ￿
l 16.839 16.736 16.892 16.685
Below ￿
m 38.721 38.023 37.468 37.860
Below ￿
u 63.596 62.251 61.571 61.872
Probability of a change in the indexation and contribution rates (with a ratio below ￿
m)
Only indexation rate 3.869 4.371 4.391 4.356
Both rates is enough 34.204 33.033 32.444 32.875
Both rates is not enough 0.648 0.619 0.633 0.629
Average policy parameters (standard deviation in parentheses)
Contribution rate ￿
S
t 19.626 19.570 19.339 19.457
(5.905) (5.910) (5.941) (5.931)
Indexation rate ￿t 29.143 29.666 30.230 29.724
(31.417) (31.402) (31.498) (31.422)
% Welfare comparison relative to uniform indexation
PER - 9.499 2.821 4.207
EV - -0.338 -0.140 -0.325
7 Conclusions
We have analysed the consequences of di⁄erentiating the indexation of pension rights to nomi-
nal price and wage in￿ ation across groups of participants in a funded pension system like that
in the Netherlands. Our analysis was based on stochastic simulations of a small-open economy
overlapping-generations model subject to demographic, economic and ￿nancial shocks. We have
compared the usual Dutch practice of uniform indexation across all participants, with status-
dependent indexation that protects retirement bene￿ts against price in￿ ation, age-dependent in-
dexation and income-dependent indexation. Pension bu⁄ers behave rather similarly under the
various alternatives, both in terms of median bu⁄er values and in terms of volatility of those
bu⁄ers. This may not be so surprising given that the policies to regulate the value of the bu⁄ers
are identical across the various scenarios. At the aggregate level, as measured by the equivalent
variation for all groups together, uniform indexation tends to performs better than any of the
alternatives. The average di⁄erence in terms of compensating initial resources is relatively small,
though. The initial retirees bene￿t from a shift away from uniform indexation, while the workers
26and the future born are the net payers for such a shift. Most of the group speci￿c welfare e⁄ects
are purely redistributional. Finally, an increase in the retirement age without touching the existing
pension rights leaves these ￿ndings una⁄ected and does little to o⁄set the secular decline in the
indexation of the retirement bene￿ts that is needed to maintain the long-run sustainability of a
funded pension arrangement.
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